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1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper compares local government systems for the organization of solid waste 
collection in the Netherlands and Spain, the contracting out of which, it is often argued (e.g., 
Savas 1987; Domberger and Jensen 1997), serves to improve the efficiency of the service 
within the public sector. Indeed, contracting out, it has been suggested, may result in a better 
incentive structure for managers and act to promote competition for the market. Moreover, 
contracting out would seem to facilitate the exploitation of scale economies (Donahue 1989). 
However, these potential cost advantages must be set against the higher transaction costs 
incurred when contracting out. The recent literature has tended to cast doubts on the savings 
to be made from private production, arguing that asset specificity is also of importance for 
waste collection, and that the unique characteristics of local service markets means a 
considerable amount of information is required to guarantee effective competition (Bel, 
Hebdon and Warner 2007; Dijkgraaf and Gradus 2007; Bel and Warner 2008; Warner and 
Hefetz 2008). All in all, therefore, governments would appear to play a critical role in 
managing these markets, where the key question must be whether these authorities have the 
opportunity to exploit scale economies and promote competition, and -at the same time- to 
minimize transaction costs.  
Spanish municipalities, according to Warner and Bel (2008), are opting increasingly 
for mixed (public-private) firms and inter-municipal cooperation. In Spain, where little 
emphasis is placed on competition, the main concern appears to be with maintaining the 
benefits of economies of scale. However, elsewhere, more specifically in the Netherlands and 
some of the Scandinavian countries, local authorities implement a more mixed policy, 
emphasizing certain elements of a competitive market approach while maintaining the 
benefits of scale economies. Interestingly, in other European countries -such as the UK- inter-
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municipal cooperation is not used for service provision because of the marked emphasis on 
market methods (Kelly 2007). 
Inter-municipal cooperation is also a significant feature in the US, where local 
fragmentation is marked. In the US, inter-municipal cooperation is usually not compatible 
with private production (e.g. Warner and Hefetz 2002a, 2002b; Levin and Tadelis 2008), 
although it is seen as a form of contracting out. Indeed, many US local governments contract 
out with other local government or public agencies and, as such, delivery is the responsibility 
of an external (public) producer (Warner and Bel 2008). However, inter-municipal 
cooperation in the US differs from the way in which this organizational form is understood 
and implemented in the countries we study here. Neither in the Netherlands nor in Spain does 
inter-municipal cooperation involve the contracting out to another local government or public 
agency, rather it involves participating in multi-government joint authorities.  
 Interestingly, both the Netherlands and Spain are EU members that operate within the 
latter’s framework of legislative competition. However, there is no clear trend towards 
privatization in these countries (or, for that matter, in Europe as a whole, see Dijkgraaf and 
Gradus 2008c). In the Netherlands, there has been a comparatively greater emphasis placed on 
the use of public firms, with considerable managerial autonomy, but with ultimate control 
remaining in the hands of the owner governments. Today, these public firms compete for 
contracts with private firms in a growing number of municipalities. By contrast, in Spain less 
emphasis is given to public firms and where they do exist, they do not compete for contracts 
outside their own municipality. By way of an alternative, the small average municipality size 
in Spain has resulted in many instances of inter-municipal cooperation.
Managing the market, either by means of competition or inter-municipal cooperation, 
is likely to have had positive effects on delivery costs. However, according to empirical 
evidence for the Netherlands, no systematic cost differences are found when comparing 
private production with that of public firms that had won a contract through competition 
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(Dijkgraaf and Gradus 2003, 2007). Similarly, in the case of Spain, evidence shows that 
public and private production do not present any systematic cost differences (Bel and Costas 
2006), while those municipalities that cooperate report lower costs than those that do not 
cooperate (with cost differences disappearing in municipalities with more than 20,000 
inhabitants, when scale economies have been exploited). Therefore, it is clearly of interest to 
gain an understanding of the institutional and political structures that can influence choices of 
solid waste delivery. 
 This paper provides an explanatory analysis of the nature of differences in solid waste 
collection in Spain and the Netherlands. In the section that follows, we describe public sector 
organizations in the two countries, focusing specifically at the local level so as to have a full 
understanding of the policy environment in which decisions are taken. We then present an 
overview of the organization of solid waste collection (its collection and transport), but we do 
not examine the related services of waste treatment, as their nature and competitive 
environment are markedly different (Dijkgraaf and Gradus 2008c). Next, we analyze both 
Dutch and Spanish market structures and because of the predominance of private firms, the 
role of flexible forms is emphasized. This provides a useful framework for the analysis that 
we undertake in the next section of inter-municipal cooperation in the two countries. Finally, 
we draw our conclusions. 
2. PUBLIC SECTOR ORGANIZATIONS AND POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT 
Much has been written about the potential influence of ideological factors and political 
objectives on local privatization decisions. However, the empirical evidence available – 
including literature reviews (Bel and Fageda 2007) and meta-regression analyses (Bel and 
Fageda 2008b), as well as country-specific evidence for Spain (Bel and Miralles 2003; Bel 
and Fageda 2008a) and the Netherlands (Dijkgraaf, Gradus and Melemberg 2003) - suggests 
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that ideology has not played a particularly relevant role in the privatization of solid waste 
collection. Political objectives, by contrast, might have had a limited influence on 
privatization, particularly as regards private interests and their interaction with the local 
political process. Here we focus on the institutional and political structures in the belief that 
differences attributable to historical traditions might influence choices in local service 
delivery.
2.1. The Netherlands 
In 1996 there were 625 municipalities in the Netherlands (the first and smallest tier of 
government), but by 2006, the number of municipalities had fallen to 458, reflecting in the 
main the merger of small municipalities. The overall population rose from 15.5 million in 
1996 to 16.3 million inhabitants in 2006, while the average number of inhabitants per 
municipality in this period increased from 24,790 to almost 35,664. The largest Dutch city, 
Amsterdam, today has a population of 739,510 inhabitants. In 2006, 19 municipalities had 
more than 100,000 inhabitants, while only 64 Dutch municipalities had fewer than 10,000 
inhabitants. The second tier of government consists of 12 provinces, with the number of cities 
in 2006 varying from just six (Flevoland) to 83 (Zuid-Holland). Elections usually take place 
every four years, and are proportional and based on a party list. 
The mayor and aldermen form the municipality’s executive board. The former is 
appointed by central government, and his or her executive powers are limited. The number of 
aldermen varies according to the number of inhabitants. Since 2002, aldermen do not have to 
be members of the municipal council, although they need the support of the majority of the 
council. In general, the parties represented on the executive board form a majority in the 
council. The same structure applies also to the provinces. The Royal Commissioner and 
deputies form the executive board. The former is appointed by central government, and his or 
her executive powers are also limited. In the Netherlands, the role of the provinces in the 
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provision of government services is somewhat limited. Nevertheless, the provinces do play an 
important role in implementing environmental law.  
2.2. Spain 
Local government has several jurisdictions. The first, and most basic, is the 
municipality. Unlike the Netherlands, Spain has not experienced a consolidation of these 
entities, so while in 1996 there were 8,097 municipalities by 2006 this figure had increased to 
8,110. Many of these are particularly small: in 1996, 5,931 municipalities (73% of the total) 
had fewer than 2,000 inhabitants, while in 2006, the number had fallen slightly to 5,836 (72% 
of the total). Hence, the average population per municipality is low: the average number of 
inhabitants per municipality was 4,899 in 1996 and 5,513 in 2006. This increase in the 
average size reflects, in the main, the marked increase in the population of Spain due to 
immigration between 2001 and 2006 (8.8%).  
Local elections in Spain are based on party lists and the members of the municipal 
council are elected on a proportional basis. The mayor is then elected indirectly by the 
municipal council members. An absolute majority is required for a mayor to be elected after 
the first round of voting. If no candidate obtains this majority then the name leading the list 
that obtained most votes at the local election is elected mayor. The mayor is responsible for 
appointing the members of the municipal government, all of whom must be members of the 
municipal council. 
The next tiers in the local government framework are constituted by the counties 
(‘comarcas’) and provinces (hereinafter ‘provincias’ to distinguish them from the Dutch 
provinces). The counties are to be found in just a few regions (e.g., Catalonia), whereas the 
provincias exist all over Spain, totaling 50 in all. In general, the county and provincial 
governments (‘Diputación’) are elected indirectly. Their respective councils are formed on the 
basis of the results obtained in the local elections by all the parties that participated in the 
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territory of each jurisdiction. Only members of the municipal councils can sit as members of 
the county council and the provincial council too. The members of the county/provincial 
council elect the president, and he/she is responsible for appointing the members of the 
corresponding government, all of whom must be members of the council.  
2.3. Summary 
At the municipal level the differences between Spain and the Netherlands are 
particularly great. The average Spanish municipality is smaller in population than its Dutch 
counterpart. Interestingly, the central government appoints the Dutch mayor, while the 
municipal council elects the Spanish mayor and, as a result, the Spanish municipal executive 
power is more politically oriented. The same characteristics are equally apparent at the 
provincial level.  Table 1 summarizes the main differences between the two countries. 
[Insert Table 1] 
Local governments in Spain enjoy greater power when it comes to engaging more 
flexible organizational forms such as mixed public-private firms. They have greater freedom 
to set up joint political governance bodies, which in turn enjoy greater flexibility when 
deciding how to organize the delivery of the solid waste collection service, e.g., by municipal 
cooperation. These differences are particularly significant in the case of the service that 
concerns us here, solid waste collection. Empirical evidence indicates that scale economies 
exist in this service for populations around 20,000 inhabitants (Stevens, 1978; Dijkgraaf and 
Gradus, 2003, Bel and Costas, 2006). Therefore, as most Spanish municipalities fall below 
this optimal size, strong local power means that more flexible organizational forms (such as 
cooperation) in order to address this scale problem can be experimented with.  
3. ORGANIZATION OF SOLID WASTE COLLECTION 
Dutch and Spanish municipalities are under a legal obligation to provide collection 
services for municipal waste, but they are free to choose whether to deliver this service 
Research Institute of Applied Economics 2008                                               Working Papers 2008/15, 27 pages
7
themselves or to contract it out to outside firms. In this section we describe the organization 
of the solid waste collection market in both countries.  
3.1. Data and sources 
Our data on the amount of waste and the methods of waste treatment applied in the 
Netherlands are for 2006 and are based on a dataset for all 458 municipalities produced by the 
Dutch Waste Management Council (see Senternovem, 2006). Data for Spain are for 2003 and 
are taken from the II Survey on Local Services, conducted in 2003-2004 by the research unit 
‘Public policies and economic regulation’ (ppre), at the University of Barcelona. This survey 
provides information for 540 municipalities with a population above 2,000 inhabitants, which 
represents almost 25% of Spanish municipalities of this size. It is worth remembering at this 
point that the average population of the Spanish municipalities with more than 2,000 
inhabitants is 18,402. This figure is considerably greater than the overall Spanish average 
(5,513), and much closer to the average Dutch population (35,664). Hence, while differences 
in population sizes are initially important, restricting the Spanish sample to cities above 2,000 
reduces such differences in average size and allows more meaningful comparisons to be 
made. Bel (2006) contains detailed information on the survey methodology and the data.  
3.2. The Netherlands 
In 2006, 174 Dutch municipalities (38% of the total, representing 29% of the 
population) were contracting out waste collection to a private firm, while 115 municipalities 
(25% of the total, representing 27% of the population) were contracting the service out to a 
public firm. Over the last decade, public firms have begun to compete with private firms for 
contracts (Dijkgraaaf and Gradus 2008b). Today, therefore, contracting out involves both 
private and public firms, and is a practice adopted in 63% of the municipalities (representing 
58% of the population). A third group, 14% of the municipalities (9% of the population) 
operate a municipal waste collection service in cooperation with neighboring cities. The 
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remaining municipalities collect the waste themselves (i.e., 23% of the municipalities, 
representing 35% of the population). Tables 2a and 2b show detailed information of these 
practices.
[Insert Table 2a and Table 2b] 
Unlike in Spain, a public body is responsible for overseeing compulsory inter-
municipal cooperation in the Netherlands.  Below, we discuss this issue in more detail. Mixed 
firms do not exist in the Netherlands. Over time the number of municipalities using a public 
firm has increased, while municipal cooperation and self-supply has decreased, and private 
collection has remained more or less stable (Dijkgraaf and Gradus 2008a). Interestingly, in 
large Dutch cities self-supply is much more common than firm delivery, while in small 
municipalities firms play a much larger role.   
3.3. Spain 
In the case of Spain, we only have data for municipalities with more than 2,000 inhabitants. In 
2003, 56% of these municipalities contracted out solid waste collection to private firms and, 
thus, two-thirds of the population were served by a private firm, since the average population 
of municipalities with private production is higher than that of municipalities with public 
production. Direct production (bureaucracy) was present in almost a quarter of the 
municipalities (15% of the population), whereas 12% of the municipalities (and 12% of the 
population) were served by a public firm, which ultimately comes under government control 
but which, nevertheless, operates under private law. Tables 3a and 3b show more detailed 
information. 
(Insert Table 3a and Table 3b) 
Finally, 7% of the municipalities (6% of the population) in 2003 were served by mixed 
firms. As Warner and Bel (2008) explain ownership in these mixed firms is shared between 
the government and the private sector, with the government retaining an important stake in 
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the firm, albeit that the firm’s operations are governed by private commercial law. The private 
partner tends to be a large firm with a consolidated position in the market for the private 
production of the local service. In such instances, the day-to-day business is usually 
conducted by the private industrial partner, with the government retaining control over certain 
strategic decisions. Within this organizational framework, municipal (or supra-municipal) 
governments enter into long-term contracts with private firms through joint venture 
agreements. 
Little can be said about the dynamics of the waste collection sector in Spain, since up-
to-date data are unavailable for the country as a whole.  However, data for the region of 
Catalonia show that practices involving contracting out to private contractors are stable over 
time. In 2000, 81.7% of Catalan municipalities with a population over 1,000 inhabitants had 
resorted to private production for their waste collection (Bel and Costas 2006). In 2006 the 
use of private firms stood at 81.2% (Bel and Fageda 2007b). 
3.4. Summary 
A comparison of practices in Spain and the Netherlands shows that market shares for 
direct production by the municipality (bureaucracy) are quite similar in the two countries if 
measured in terms of the number of municipalities (though this is not the case if measured in 
terms of the share of population). Private firms have a higher share of the market in Spain, 
while the market share of public firms is much higher in Netherlands than it is in Spain.  
In Spain, private production is virtually equivalent to contracting out, since public 
firms only collect waste within their own municipalities. One reason for this can be local 
governments in Spain have more power than their Dutch counterparts. Hence, political 
competition between cities might well be stronger, and this might have led to a certain 
reluctance on the part of some authorities to contract out to another government, and thus 
discouraged competition from public firms. Finally, local public firms in Spain require legal 
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authorization before they can participate in contracts outside their jurisdiction, and the 
bureaucratic procedures that must be gone through in order to obtain this permission can be 
lengthy and taxing. These obstacles serve to discourage public firms from competing for 
external contracts. Thus, in Spain there tends to be no competition for contracts between 
public and private firms, whereas in the Netherlands levels of competition are on the increase. 
Interestingly, in the Netherlands public production increases with municipality size, 
while in Spain public production is more common among the smaller municipalities. Bel and 
Miralles (2003) suggest that this pattern reflects the fact that the high transaction costs 
associated with the contracting out of the service have a greater impact on the smallest 
municipalities. However, the trade-off between the savings to be made from contracting out 
and the high transaction costs is enhanced if the population increases. 
Finally, inter-municipal cooperation is not strictly comparable between the two 
countries. In the Netherlands, inter-municipal cooperation typically involves a few 
municipalities whose joint efforts to deliver this service, and all other municipal co-operation 
agreements for that matter, are run as a public service. By contrast, in Spain inter-municipal 
cooperation tends to mean that municipal governments engage in partnerships under a joint 
authority in governance in which all the governments play a role. In this situation, a choice 
can then be made between different forms of service delivery: public production, private 
production, or mixed firms. Hence, inter-municipal cooperation is not strictly linked to public 
production, and cooperation and privatization are not incompatible (Bel and Fageda, 2006 
2008a). Below we discuss inter-municipal cooperation in more detail. 
4. MARKET STRUCTURE 
Here we describe the structure of the solid waste collection market using a measure of 
concentration, the Hirschman-Herfindahl index (HHI). HHI can be defined as the sum of the 
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squared market shares, and lies between 0 (full competition) and 1 (monopoly). The number 
of (artificial) competitors active in the market can be estimated by 1/HHI. The advantage of 
using HHI over simple concentration rates consists in its ability to take into account the 
number of firms and the differences between them (spread in size). To provide additional 
information, the concentration ratios CR1 and CR4 were also considered. CR1 is defined by 
the market share of the largest company, while CR4 is the market share of the four largest 
companies.   
4.1. The Netherlands 
Three firms dominate the market in the Netherlands: SITA serves 74 municipalities, 
Van Gansewinkel 32, and AVR 23. The activity of SITA is evenly spread over the country 
(being active in 10 of the 12 provinces). Van Gansewinkel is active in six provinces (above all 
in the south of the country). Interestingly, AVR began life as a public company in the region 
of Rijnmond, becoming private in 2006, and today it is active in four provinces. These large 
private firms are active in small and large municipalities alike. This characteristic is also clear 
if we divide the markets into municipality size groups. As can be seen in Tables 4a and 4b, 
SITA is the leading firm in all groups, both in terms of concessions and population. The 
market shares of Van Gansewinkel and AVR are also surprisingly stable over the different 
groups, although they exchange second and third places with each other. The Tables clearly 
illustrate the dominance of these three firms on the private side of the market. However, their 
market position would seem to have been weakened by the entry of a number of public firms. 
Indeed, in  those provinces in which public firms have entered the market for contracts, prices 
have fallen (Dijkgraaf and Gradus 2008b). 
[Insert Table 4a and Table 4b] 
The 2006 Herfindahl concentration index for private firms in the Dutch national 
market is 0.23 with respect to population and 0.24 with respect to the number of 
Research Institute of Applied Economics 2008                                               Working Papers 2008/15, 27 pages
12
municipalities (or concessions). Compared with a threshold value of 0.18 used by the 
regulators, this means that the market is concentrated. If we take the province as our level of 
study, the concentration is even higher, although it is not spread evenly over the country. 
Some provinces do not have any private collection firms at all (Flevoland and Friesland), 
while others have a high incidence of such firms. At this provincial level, the HHI stands 
between 0.22 (Noord-Brabant) and 1.0 (Drenthe).
As discussed above, public firms are increasingly acting as competitors for private 
firms and, as such, the HHI can be calculated by including these public firms as well. At the 
national scale, the 2006 Herfindahl index is now only 0.08 (see Table 5) suggesting a 
competitive market. Still, concentration might be intense at the provincial level, since the 
Herfindahl index is very high for a number of provinces. At this provincial level, the HHI 
stands between 0.16 (Noord-Brabant) and 1.0 (Friesland), with all contracts being awarded to 
just one public firm.  
[Insert Table 5] 
The increasing importance of Dutch public firms becomes apparent also if we compare 
the HHI over time. In Table 5 the two HHIs are compared for the years 2002 and 2006. The 
HHI has decreased overtime, both when public firms are excluded and included. However, for 
the private HHI the decrease is more moderate than for the HHI including public firms. 
Interestingly, in some provinces municipal co-operation has resulted in the creation of public 
firms, thus strengthening competition further. 
4.2. Spain 
 In Spain, the market share of the leading firm (Fomento de Construcciones y Contratas -
FCC) reaches 33% of concessions and 52% of the population served (Bel, 2006). The two 
other leading firms are Ferrovial-Cespa (18% of concessions and 17% of the population) and 
ACS-Urbaser (14% of concessions, 16% of the population). Taken together, all three major 
firms concentrate 65% of the concessions and 85% of the population served. If we consider 
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the market of the larger municipalities separately (population > 10,000), the share of the 
leading firms is even higher (72% of concessions together). If we add together the market 
shares of the first four leading groups, we see that they concentrate two-thirds of the 
concessions (three-quarters in medium and large size cities) and almost 90% of the 
population. As discussed earlier, public firms do not compete for concessions in Spain, so 
here we only consider private firms in our analysis of market concentration. Tables 6a and 6b 
display detailed information. 
[Insert Table 6a and Table 6b] 
 The Herfindahl-Hirschman index is 0.16 for concessions and 0.33 for population. 
Compared with the threshold value of 0.18, the market is indeed concentrated. Moreover, the 
results at the regional level usually show degrees of concentration that are higher than those 
found for Spain as a whole.
 Since the data available for the Spanish market relates to just one year, we cannot draw 
any inferences about the dynamics of concentration over time. However, comparable data for 
the region of Catalonia in 2000 and 2006 show a trend of increasing concentration in this 
region, as Table 7 shows. Our data for Catalonia are taken for 2000 and 2006 and are based 
on a survey of local services run by the ppre research unit at the University of Barcelona and 
the Catalan Competition Commission [detailed information regarding survey methodology 
and data can be consulted in Bel and Costas (2006) and Bel and Fageda (2007b)]. Indeed, the 
HHI for concessions increased by almost 25% between 2000 and 2006, while the HHI for 
population served increased by 13% between these two dates. As the incidence of contracting 
out to private firms did not change in this period, the concentration of the largest firms has in 
all likelihood increased. Since Catalonia is the region with the largest private market of 
concessions, our evidence suggests that increasing concentration should be a concern for the 
whole country. 
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[Insert Table 7] 
 Spain has a dual market, which in the case of the Netherlands is not so marked. Market 
concentration indexes for the Spanish market provide strong evidence for the existence of this 
dual market (Bel 2008, Bel and Fageda 2008c). Major firms are more likely to be the contract 
holders in large municipalities as well as in those municipalities in which more firms have 
participated in the bid for the last contract. Hence, major firms tend to operate in large 
municipalities (as well as at the supra-national level even, with some of them being active 
players in foreign markets, including the United Kingdom, Davies 2007). Although more 
firms participate in the bids for the most profitable contracts, the three major firms are the 
usual bidders. Given that the average number of bidders is below four, even in the largest 
municipalities, there would seem to be a highly oligopolistic sector in this segment of the 
market. By contrast, smaller regional or local firms are more likely to be the contract holders 
in small municipalities, which similarly tend not to receive many bids for their contracts. 
Thus, these smaller firms can operate as a local monopoly that does not suffer any market 
competition, because very few firms (if any, other than the incumbent,) tend to participate in 
the bids for the contract (Bel and Fageda 2008c).
4.3. Summary 
Concentration indexes in the Netherlands are lower than those in Spain, and show a 
tendency to decrease rather than increase. In the Netherlands, the difference between 
concentration indexes when public firms are alternately excluded and included is relevant, as 
public firms in this country bid for contracts in municipalities outside their own jurisdiction, 
which is not the case in Spain. The expanding role of Dutch public firms probably counteracts 
the natural tendency of private firms, as can be seen in Spain.
In Spain, the dominance of the major firms in the large municipalities combined with 
local monopolies in small municipalities seems to indicate that the intensity of competition in 
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local markets is lower than optimal from a social welfare point of view. It also tells an 
interesting story in terms of market dominance and political power. According to findings 
reported in Bel and Fageda (2008c) in their study of the region of Catalonia, large nationwide 
firms tend to be associated with contracts awarded by municipalities that are governed by 
national political parties, whereas municipalities ruled by regional parties seem more likely to 
award contracts to local or micro-regional private firms. This would appear to suggest quite 
clearly that market dominance has important political implications for local governments. In 
the Netherlands as well, the dominance of the private parties is important, but the political 
links are much weaker than in Spain. 
5. IMPORTANCE OF INTER-MUNICIPAL COOPERATION 
5.1. Netherlands 
In the Netherlands, inter-municipal cooperation (WGR) is employed for certain 
government services including fire brigades , solid waste collection and health care. 
Municipalities are free to choose whether they actually work together in the WGR or they 
prefer to operate alone. For solid waste collection, only 14% of the Dutch municipalities use 
inter-municipal cooperation, falling from 19% in 2002 (Dijkgraaf and Gradus 2008b). The 
organizations that manage inter-municipal cooperation (hereinafter ‘cooperations’) are not 
only responsible for waste collection, but actually collect the waste themselves. They act, 
therefore, as a substitute for a municipal public unit or a firm (public or private).
There are no direct elections for WGR board members and inter-municipal 
cooperations are mainly run by the mayors and some aldermen. On a day-to-day basis, civil 
servants manage the municipal cooperations, and, as such, the political profile of the 
municipal cooperation is low. All cooperations are run as a public service. Some of the 
political parties are, however, in favor of direct elections for municipal cooperations.
5.2. Spain 
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In Spain, almost half the municipalities with a population above 2,000 provide solid 
waste collection through inter-municipal cooperation. Table 8 shows the frequency of inter-
municipal cooperation in Spain and the different forms of production (private, public and 
mixed) used under inter-municipal cooperation. It should be noted that through inter-
municipal cooperation, municipal governments engage in partnerships under a joint authority 
(either a supramunicipal institution –at the county or province level-, or a single purpose 
agency), the governance of which is assumed by all the governments involved. Within this 
framework, the choice is made between private production, public production or mixed firms 
for service delivery. Thus, cooperation and privatization are not incompatible in Spain (Bel 
and Fageda 2006, 2008). Indeed, the county or the provincial council decides what form of 
production is to be used to deliver solid waste collection. It is worth noting that municipalities 
are free to retain municipal provision or to engage in inter-municipal cooperation,  as this 
remains a municipal responsibility. 
 [Insert Table 8] 
Cooperation tends to be more frequent among small municipalities, indicating that it is 
used as a method to take advantage of scale economies. In addition, inter-municipal 
cooperation is more frequent in municipalities that retain public production, suggesting that it 
may be used as an alternative to privatization as well. On the relationship between 
cooperation and delivery costs, the evidence is mixed. In Spain, inter-municipal cooperation 
is linked significantly to lower costs (Bel and Costas 2006, Mur 2008). By contrast, in the 
Netherlands cooperation is associated with higher costs (Dijkgraaf and Gradus 2007). 
Internationally, this issue has not been analyzed in many countries. However, a cost 
disadvantage for cooperation has also been reported in Norway (Sørensen 2008, 1055). It 
seems that the type of cooperation prevalent in Spain is unique, since it fully exploits scale 
economies with low transaction costs.  
5.3. Summary 
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In Spain the use of inter-municipal cooperation is three times greater than in the 
Netherlands. Moreover, Spanish inter-municipal cooperation is compatible with privatization, 
while in the Netherlands it is not. There would appear to be two main explanations for these 
differences. First, the average Spanish municipality size is small and, hence, there is a greater 
need for cooperation. Second, public firms and mergers between municipalities would seem 
to constitute an alternative to exploit scale economies in the Netherlands.  
The literature on cooperative competition and the ‘Third Italy’ strategy has 
emphasized the advantage of geographically concentrated networks of enterprises (e.g., 
Hansen, 1992) and their successful adoption by efficient local governments in Italy has been 
reported as significant (Brusco, 1982). Nonetheless, this does not appear to be the case with 
the inter-municipal cooperation described here, since no network of local firms or units has 
developed. In fact, a single organization (public in the Netherlands; public, private or mixed 
in Spain) is in charge of waste collection. One likely rationale for engaging in cooperation is 
the ability to exploit economies of scale while preserving public monopoly as a form of 
service delivery. In Spain, moreover, inter-municipal cooperation may result from the 
attempts made by small governments to enter the market for private contracts when they take 
the decision to contract out, since half the municipalities that cooperate have that service 
contracted out. 
6. DISCUSSION
Table 9 summarizes the main differences identified in this paper in solid waste 
collection in Spain and the Netherlands.
[Insert Table 9] 
While private production is much more frequent in Spain than it is in the Netherlands, 
the frequency of contracting out is relatively similar in both countries. The explanation for 
this would seem to lie in the differences in the services of public firms. In Spain, public firms 
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generally deliver the service only in the municipality(ies) that owns that particular firm. By 
contrast, in the Netherlands, it is quite common for public firms to bid for contracts in other 
municipalities. Since public firms in Spain do not usually operate beyond the limits of their 
own jurisdiction, contracting out is in practice equivalent to private market practices. 
The fact that public firms do not operate outside the boundaries of their jurisdiction 
means that other public firms from outside a specific jurisdiction do not usually constitute an 
alternative when private contracts fail. It is perhaps because of this that mixed public-private 
firms (partial privatization) are relatively common in Spain, whereas they do not exist in the 
Netherlands. The political power wielded by local governments is stronger in Spain than it is 
in the Netherlands; because of this, their municipalities can engage in complex organizational 
forms (which include sharing firm ownership with the private sector). In this sense, greater 
levels of discretional power in Spain are linked to greater organizational flexibility.
Whereas the use of hybrid organizational forms, such as mixed public-private firms, can 
solve problems of contract failure and lack of capabilities or competence for public delivery 
in Spain, it is not a viable alternative in order to maintain a competitive environment in the 
solid waste collection market. Concentration indexes in the Netherlands are smaller than those 
in Spain, and while in the Netherlands concentration is decreasing, in Spain it would seem to 
be increasing. This can be explained by the fact that public firms in the Netherlands bid for 
contracts in municipalities outside their own jurisdiction, which is not the case in Spain. In the 
Netherlands, involving public firms in tendering seems to serve to increase competition and to 
reduce the market power of private contractors. In Spain, public firms, mixed firms and 
private firms do not interact with each other. Hence, public competitors bring no competitive 
pressure to bear on private contractors.
A further institutional difference with significant ramifications for market structure is 
the fact that Spain has many more municipalities and that their average population is much 
smaller than in the Netherlands. One consequence of this is the existence in Spain of a dual 
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market for solid waste, with large municipalities and large firms operating in one half, and 
small cities and towns with local and regional firms operating in the other. It is not profitable 
for large firms to operate in small cities and towns, while small local and regional firms do 
not have the capability to operate in large cities and metropolitan areas. As these two markets 
are no more than only slightly connected, competition is damaged. By contrast, large firms in 
the Netherlands operate across municipalities of all sizes. Indeed, population density and 
municipality size (inhabitants) in the Netherlands is greater, which means that most contracts 
have a potential appeal for the major players.  
The restrictions imposed on Spanish municipalities due to low population levels (a small 
private market with a small number of suppliers), together with the considerable political 
power that local governments wield have led many small cities and towns to engage in inter-
municipal cooperation whereby the compatibility of this type of provision with all production 
forms is preserved. Through inter-municipal cooperation small Spanish municipalities can 
exploit scale economies without the need to contract a private firm or, alternatively, they  can 
achieve greater joint bargaining power in order to initiate a contracting process. By contrast, 
incidences of inter-municipal cooperation in the Netherlands are much less frequent. As, 
unlike in Spain, inter-municipal cooperation has a cost disadvantage in the Netherlands, a 
finding in line with reports in Sørensen (2008).
 In short, Spain has a consolidation problem, typified by more instances of privatization 
and cooperation, but lower levels of competition. The Netherlands, on the other hand, 
presents a greater average municipality size, and as a result we find fewer instances of 
privatization, and less cooperation. Public firms are more widely used in the Netherlands, and 
this helps to some degree to overcome the competition problem resulting from the increasing 
levels of concentration that are emerging in the private market. The differences between the 
two countries as regards the size of their municipalities, the power wielded by local 
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governments, and the extent to which public firms operate are key factors in accounting for 
these differences. 
Overall, contracting out might lead to saving costs thanks to the exploitation of scale 
economies and the promotion of market competition (Bel, Hebdon and Warner 2007). 
However, contracting out might also lead to higher transaction costs. Spain and the 
Netherlands adopt distinct organizational forms in order to deal with both scale economies 
and transaction costs. Spanish local governments quite frequently resort to inter-municipal 
cooperation and mixed firms, while the use of public firms and the merging of municipalities 
is frequent in the Netherlands. One lesson that the Netherlands might learn could well be that 
a more powerful political framework for municipal cooperation is desirable if it wishes to 
implement more flexible organizational forms.  
Market competition may be weak in both countries as the concentration is relatively 
high. However, in the Netherlands the increasing importance of public firms as external 
players in concessions for delivering waste has improved market competition. As regards 
concentration, therefore, the Dutch solution would seem to provide better results. And it is 
here that a lesson of potential interest emerges for Spain: encouraging public firms to compete 
for contracts outside their own particular municipality could enhance competition and restrict 
positions of dominance. 
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Tables
Table 1: Main differences in public sector organization  
 Netherlands Spain 
Number of municipalities (2006) 458 8,110 
Average size (2006) 35,664 5,513     (18,402)* 
Mayor Appointed by Central 
Government 
Elected (indirectly) in 
local election
Empowerment of local government Limited Strong 
* Figure in brackets shows the average population in municipalities over 2,000 inhabitants in Spain 
(much closer to the Dutch average) 
 Source: Authors’ own
Table 2a: Form of production of refuse collection in Netherlands. Municipalities
  Netherlands (2006) 
Municipality size (population) 
Public Unit 
(Bureaucracy) 
Public 
Firm 
Mixed 
Firm 
Private
Firm Other 
986-10,000 9.4% 25.0% 0.0% 40.6% 25.0% 
10,001-30,000 19.5% 23.6% 0.0% 44.3% 12.6% 
30,001-50,000 27.7% 20.5% 0.0% 37.3% 14.5% 
50,001-100,000 42.5% 32.5% 0.0% 12.5% 12.5% 
More than 100,000 44.0% 44.0% 0.0% 12.0% 0.0% 
Total (weighted)  22.9% 25.1% 0.0% 38.0% 14.0% 
Table 2b: Form of production of refuse collection in Netherlands. Population 
  Netherlands (2006) 
Municipality size (population) 
Public Unit 
(Bureaucracy) 
Public 
Firm 
Mixed 
Firm 
Private
Firm Other 
986-10,000 10.3% 26.8% 0.0% 40.9% 21.9% 
10,001-30,000 23.1% 23.1% 0.0% 41.9% 11.9% 
30,001-50,000 34.3% 20.6% 0.0% 30.5% 14.6% 
50,001-100,000 34.4% 47.8% 0.0% 12.0% 5.8% 
More than 100,000 67.0% 7.5% 0.0% 25.6% 0.0% 
Total (weighted)  35.3% 26.6% 0.0% 28.7% 9.4% 
Source: Senternovem (2006) and authors’ own calculations 
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Table 3a: Form of production of refuse collection in Spain. Municipalities 
 Spain (2003) 
Municipality size (population) Public Unit 
(Bureaucracy) 
Public 
Firm 
Mixed 
Firm 
Private Firm Other 
  2,001 – 10,000  27.1% 13.0% 8.2% 51.7% 0.0% 
10,001 – 30,000  20.0% 9.2% 4.3% 66.5% 0.0% 
30,001 – 50,000  14.5% 18.4% 2.6% 64.5% 0.0% 
50,001 – 100,000  9.6% 11.0% 5.5% 72.6% 1.4% 
More than 100,000  14.0% 17.5% 3.5% 64.9% 0.0% 
Total (weighted)  24.2% 12.4% 7.0% 56.3% 0.1% 
Table 3b: Form of production of refuse collection in Spain. Population 
 Spain (2003) 
Municipality size (population) Public Unit 
(Bureaucracy) 
Public 
Firm 
Mixed 
Firm 
Private
Firm 
Other 
  2,001 - 10,000  26.1% 10.8% 8.8% 54.3% 0.0% 
10,001 - 30,000  19.6% 9.5% 4.5% 66.4% 0.0% 
30,001 - 50,000  15.1% 18.9% 2.6% 63.4% 0.0% 
50,001 – 100,000  9.5% 10.8% 5.0% 73.0% 1.7% 
More than 100,000  9.5% 14.1% 5.3% 71.1% 0.0% 
Total (weighted)  14.8% 12.4% 5.6% 67.0% 0.2% 
Notes:   In building the figure for ‘Total’, gross percentages resulting from the sample have been adjusted. To do 
so, we have taken into account the different frequency of responses to the Survey obtained across 
municipality sizes. 
Other means that the city territory is divided in different service areas. One (or some) of them are served by 
public firms and one (or some) are served by private firms.  
Municipalities over 2,000 pop.  n=540 
Source: Based on Bel, G. 2006. Economía y política de la privatización local (Economics and Politics of Local 
Privatization). Madrid: Marcial Pons, 196 & 198. 
Table 4a. Market shares (in %) and concentration indexes in Netherlands. Concessions private firms 2006 
  N 
Leading
Group Share 
Second
Group Share 
Third
Group Share CR1 CR4 HHI 
Total  174 SITA 42.0% Gansew. 20.1% AVR 13.2% 0.420 0.828 0.241 
Total  (pop > 10,000) 148 SITA 41.9% Gansew. 22.3% AVR 12.2% 0.419 0.838 0.247 
Munic. Pop  > 30,000  39 SITA 35.9% Gansew. 28.2% AVR 15.4% 0.359 0.821 0.238 
Pop. 10,001 to 30,000  109 SITA 44.0% Gansew. 20.2% AVR 11.0% 0.440 0.844 0.256 
Munic. Pop < 10,000 26 SITA 42.3% AVR 19.2% Gansew. 7.7% 0.423 0.769 0.235 
Table 4b. Market shares (in %) and concentration indexes in Netherlands. Population served by private firms 2006. 
  N 
Leading
Group Share 
Second
Group Share 
Third
Group Share CR1 CR4 HHI 
Total  174 SITA 35.6% Gansew. 23.8% AVR 20.5% 0.356 0.853 0.231 
Total  (pop > 10,000) 148 SITA 35.3% Gansew. 24.4% AVR 20.6% 0.353 0.857 0.232 
Munic. Pop  > 30,000  39 SITA 29.1% AVR 28.6% Gansew. 28.3% 0.291 0.875 0.249 
Pop. 10,001 to 30,000  109 SITA 43.1% Gansew. 19.6% AVR 10.7% 0.431 0.833 0.248 
Munic. Pop < 10,000 26 SITA 41.8% AVR 19.0% Gansew. 8.9% 0.418 0.771 0.239 
Source: Senternovem (2006) and authors’ own calculations 
Table 5: Change overtime in the concentration index (HHI) in the Netherlands  
Data year HHI private HHI private/public 
2002 0.27 0.11 
2006 0.23 0.08 
                   Note:  the HHI is calculated in population. 
            Source: AOO (2002) and Senternovem (2006) and authors’ own calculations 
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Table 6a. Market shares (in %) and concentration indexes in Spain. Concessions 2003 
 N Leading 
Group 
Share Second 
Group 
Share Third 
Group 
Share CR1 CR4 HHI 
Total  350 FCC 32.9% Ferrovial 18.3% Urbaser 14.0% 0.329 0.680 0.163 
Total  (pop > 10,000) 282 FCC 36.2% Ferrovial 19.1% Urbaser 16.7% 0.362 0.745 0.198 
Munic. Pop  > 30,000  144 FCC 39.9% Ferrovial 22.9% Urbaser 19.6% 0.396 0.840 0.251 
Pop. 10,001 to 30,000  138 FCC 32.6% Ferrovial 15.1% Urbaser 13.0% 0.326 0.638 0.152 
Munic. Pop < 10,000 68 FCC 19.1% Ferrovial 14.7% * * 0.191 0.412 0.071 
Table 6b. Market shares (in %) and concentration indexes in Spain. Population served by private firms 
2003. 
 N Leading 
Group 
Share Second 
Group 
Share Third 
Group 
Share CR1 CR4 HHI 
Total  350 FCC 52.0% Ferrovial 16.9% Urbaser 16.2% 0.520 0.862 0.326 
Munic. Pop  > 30,000  144 FCC 55.2% Ferrovial 17.1% Urbaser 16.1% 0.552 0.906 0.361 
Pop. 10,001 to 30,000  138 FCC 33.4% Urbaser 16.2% Ferrovial 14.7% 0.334 0.677 0.164 
Munic. Pop < 10,000 68 Ferrovial 19.7% FCC 17.7% * * 0.197 0.464 0.084 
Note: * The sample of municipalities with a population below 10,000 does not allow us to identify with 
sufficient accuracy the name of the third group/firm in this segment. 
Source: Based on Bel, G. 2006. Economía y política de la privatización local (Economics and Politics of Local 
Privatization). Madrid: Marcial Pons, P. 243. 
Table 7: Change overtime in the concentration index (HHI) in Catalonia 
 Data year HHI concessions HHI population 
Sample 1 (103) 2000 0.106 0.268 
Sample 2 (103) 2006 0.131 0.304 
  Note: In brackets, number of municipalities in the sample. Original sources are the survey used in Bel and 
Costas (2006) for 2000 and a more recent survey conducted on behalf of the Antitrust Commission of 
Catalonia for 2006 (Bel and Fageda 2007b). Both surveys provided information on a larger sample of 
municipalities with private production: 152 for 2000 and 207 for 2006. To compare concentration indexes in 
both years we have selected all municipalities (103) for which information was obtained in both surveys. 
Hence, the sub-samples used are strictly comparable. 
 Source: Analysis of Surveys on Local Services conducted in 2000 and 2006/2007. 
Table 8. Intermunicipal cooperation in solid waste collection in Spain, 2003, municipalities > 
2,000 inhabitants  
Municipalities Mean population 
Cooperation at supramunicipal level 44.0% 20,128 
Production form (only municipalities that cooperate)
Private production 
Public production 
Mixed firm production 
51.3% 
38.6% 
10.1% 
23,330 
17,219 
15,003 
Source: Based on Bel, G. 2006. Economía y política de la privatización local (Economics and Politics of 
Local Privatization). Madrid: Marcial Pons, P. 223 & 226. 
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Table 9: Overview of differences between the Netherlands and Spain. 
 Netherlands Spain 
Inter-municipal cooperation compatible with  Public production All forms of production 
Mixed firms No Yes 
Dual Market No Yes 
Private production a  26% 67% (73%) 
Tendering b 58% 67% 
Division c No Yes 
a In number of inhabitants in 2006 in the Netherlands, and in 2003 in Spain. In Spain also mixed firms are 
included in the percentage in brackets. 
b In number of inhabitants in 2006. In the Netherlands public firms are also included.
c In Spain a few large municipalities have been divided in districts for delivery. The main examples are 
Barcelona (4) and Valencia (2).  
Source: Authors’ own.
